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PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR DAVID LANGE
PROFESSOR LANGE: The last time I said that I was delighted
to have been invited to participate in a conference, I spent the next half
hour fielding vitriolic attacks on crypto-marxists in Cleveland, so I am
not delighted to be here.
If there were eleven of us and we had an elephant, I have a hunch
that we would come closer to sensing the shape of Feist than we are
likely to do in the two days that we have together. This is, I think, a
problem, an exercise in perspective, and I am going to give you a perspective that is very personal. It is one in which I invest some considerable belief, but it does depend on a series of intersecting perspectives
that you need not share and probably no one here will entirely share.
So I am confronted at once by the probability, certainly the prospect,
that even if I am very clear, I cannot hope to succeed entirely in explaining what it is that I sense in the Feist case with respect to what I
think is the increasing likelihood that we will be practicing and studying in the field of intellectual property under an overarching umbrella
of (you will forgive me, I hope, for using this word) constitutionalization that we simply have hot experienced before.
I want to immediately address the objection that anyone knowledgeable in the intellectual property field would offer to the suggestion
that there is somehow to be a new developing overarching constitutional sense of constraints in the field of intellectual property law at
large. The objection, I think, would come along two lines of resistance.
First, that has not been the history in the field. The field is, in fact, a
very old one, and we simply do not have any reason to suppose that
that is going to be the trend. If we look at the cases so far, it is not that
they do not suggest such a trend; indeed, more to the point, it is that
they did suggest, each in its own time, that there might be some room
to develop such an overarching constitutional set of restraints in the
field of intellectual property, but in fact these cases did not develop
such restraints themselves. So the first objection to the subject is that
what we are embarking upon is unlikely. Historically, it is not indicated. Second, the other objection, which is more doctrinally grounded
than the first, but still I think even more powerful, is that the subject
does not take into account what constitutional developments the Court
has given us in the field of intellectual property at large, which historically, and still apparently on the strength of what the Court has said
even quite recently today, suggests that we may have an inner ring of
constitutional doctrines and an outer ring, and that the two simply do
not overlap in any important way. The intersecting lines are simply not
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there. So that if you look, for example, at Feist, you could object, as
Professor Raskind does, to Justice O'Connor's citation to The Trademark Cases (even if indeed you may take some great pleasure in her
citation to The Trademark Cases). The fact is that The Trademark
Cases themselves, when you read them, clearly contemplate those kinds
of intellectual property doctrines which are governed traditionally, and
even now, under the Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 constraints-the
more or less immediate constitutional constraints that touch the field.
There are those cases as to which the Court at that time, and probably
still now, seemed willing to see consigned to a kind of outer ring of
constitutionalism that only involves whatever modest restraints there
may be under the Commerce Clause. In short, anyone who suggests
that Feist was a case in which one can sense the Constitution more
strongly than had been the case before, I think, has to necessarily expect some real resistance from others who know the field equally well
and probably better. I should say before I proceed further what I had
meant to say at once. I suppose in the interest of academic ethics I am
obliged to disclose that I have a more immediate interest in the outcome of Feist than some of you may have had since I participated in
both the briefing in Feist and also in the preparation of the petition for
oral argument. In that sense Feist's outcome is not merely intriguing to
me, but indeed, an outcome which I earnestly wanted as a practicing
lawyer, and I have no misgivings at all in disclosing that. Perhaps you
should know this, because it does seem fair, to the extent that my perspectives are tinged by that experience, that you should have it in
mind.
When I read Feist, I read an opinion by a jurist who is not at all
casually but quite seriously devoted to the proposition that there are
some constitutional constraints in the field, certainly in the field of
copyright. However, I think when eventually challenged, she will see
that they are constraints that extend far more widely into the field of
intellectual property than we have been accustomed to recognizing.
I think that it is not wrong to sense in the Feist case the beginnings of a new era, not merely of protection for databases and facts and
the like as many do, but more important, I think, a new era of constitutionalization. I want now to attempt impromptu to take up Jerry
Reichman's point which I appreciate very much, and I want to incorporate into the tenor of my own remarks. In this new era, we will be
obliged to deal with at once the increasing sweep, scope, and reach of
the Constitution in the intellectual property field, while at the same
time wrestling with the problem which will, for just that reason, become more insistent and more imperative for us. The problem is simply
this-the question that Professor Reichman asks: Should the grandchilhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/7
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dren of Verdi go hungry or have to search for their bread? This is a
question that I think does not necessarily have the answer that I assume Professor Reichman supposes, given the nature of his use of the
question as a rhetorical device.
To tell you the truth, quite frankly, I do not care about the
grandchildren of Verdi. I care somewhat about Verdi but not a lot. I
am not invested in Verdi in the way that I think that Professor
Reichman is, and certainly I am not invested in the grandchildren of
Verdi. Because, you see, if I invest myself in the grandchildren of
Verdi, I also have perforce to invest myself in the grandchildren of
Groucho Marx or Johnny Carson, and I have no disposition to be interested in any of them. My view is that they can take care of themselves.
Similarly, I expect my grandchildren to take care of themselves, at
least insofar as the general draw that they might otherwise be inclined
to make on the disposition of the eiemental substance of our abilities to
engage in discourse with each other.
In short, I would answer Professor Reichman by saying that it is
precisely because of the elevated standard for originality in the most
active Berne Convention countries that the increasing use of the constitutional standard in this country will cause us problems. Because what
we have here, that they do not, is this additional source of constitutional constraint that has never really been adequately conflated with
the thinner and far more tentative development of constitutional doctrines in the intellectual property field. Of course, what I have in mind
is our very particular doctrinal concern for First Amendment freedom
of expression for which there is actually no clear affirmative positive
law doctrinal counterpart in any of the Berne Convention countries. I
do not mean, of course,, to suggest that the Berne Convention countries
do not devote themselves to freedom of expression because indeed they
do. I do mean to suggest, however, that they do not do so under the
overarching umbrella of positive, doctrinal statements of the nature of
that freedom which we have accustomed ourselves to conform with. So
that for us, and not for them, as we begin to wrestle with higher standards of originality, if indeed that is the direction in which we are moving, we will also begin to have to take into account some of the reaction
the First Amendment doctrines beget.
Now, it is here, in contemplating the First Amendment, that I begin to return to the resistance that I anticipate you may have to my
first proposition, which is that we will, in fact, experience a greater
degree of constitutional constraint in the intellectual property field than
we have been accustomed to experiencing. Such constraints will be not
just greater, but so much greater that the field will simply not look the
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think, for a number of reasons that will at first seem separate but in
their entirety will have a common set of antecedents. The reasons are
these: that we are just now attending to the business of aligning and
realigning doctrines in a field in which the fundamental presuppositions
about what we are dealing with are simply no longer there, and, when
we speak of our copyright, we are speaking about a field of doctrinal
law in which the expectation has been that the presupposition is still
that we will be dealing with and disposing of the substance of an expression having its origins chiefly in the products of the press.
That is really how the copyright law has, in fact, come to us. It is
a press-oriented law, and we are simply in a post-literate millennium or
about to enter a post-literate millennium. So'that what we are dealing
with here in a metaphorical sense is how best to consolidate the gains
of feudalism in an era in which feudalism is, in a sense, out the window. We will face the need, in short, to redefine the field rapidly, precisely because we are going to encounter a dizzying set of conflicting
claims for recognition and denials of property-like interests that we
have never encountered before. The question, for example, what do you
do with someone who invents a language, would have seemed, in the
main, chiefly droll and hypothetical 200 years ago, but today it is a
perfectly active serious question for which we must have answers, and
the answers must be answers that we can actually use.
I think that because of our capitulation to responding to social
questions of that magnitude with an increasing development of constitutional law, as well as doctrinal law, it is most likely that we will begin
to constitutionalize the field. I think that probably nothing seemed
more natural to Justice O'Connor in drafting her opinion than that she
should pick up The Trademark Cases and that she should, in fact,
make her opinion in the Feist case an expression of constitutionalism. I
think she was responding to pressures that she thought not merely exigent, but indeed more to the point, quite natural.
Now, the First Amendment, as you know, is a set of doctrinal propositions which are now so complex that entire seminars have to be
taught about them in the upper classes in law schools around the country because you can no longer teach the First Amendment in the first
year constitutional law course. And yet, as you know, had we met to
discuss freedom of the press and freedom of expression exactly one
hundred years ago, not a single precedent in the field would yet have
existed. In fact, had we met one hundred years ago to discuss freedom
of expression, we would have had to wait more than thirty years before
we encountered the first pair of precedents in this field. Not until 1964,
in fact, did the field actually begin to explode rapidly. So today we may
take
it for granted that when David Duke campaigns for the governorhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/7
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ship in the state of Louisiana, it is quite beyond thinking that we
should simply pass a law that should send him back to wherever it was
he came from. It is not in us to do that. We have foresworn that kind
of response. And yet, how recently we have foresworn that type of response is telling, I think, if you ask about the role that the Constitution
may yet play in the development of doctrines within the intellectual
property field.
When I went into practice in 1964, I began to represent newspapers. It was what today would be called an entertainment practice but
what was then called a media practice. We represented Ann Landers,
Mike Royco, and many newspapers and magazines, and so it was then
necessary for me to attend conferences like this one in which we appreciated the significance of The New York Times v. Sullivan case, which
was new that year. I remember encountering practitioners from similar
firms and from newspapers around the country who said: "Well, a
portentous case to be sure, if you read it as it is written, but surely it
cannot be taken seriously, and, then, after all, it really only has to do
with public officials. It won't reach public figures, we can be sure of
that, and certainly there is not going to be any reach under these new
sets of doctrines for matters of general public interest and concerns. So
I think we have to assume that here is a case in which perhaps the
Court -simply said, in exigent circumstances, more than it needed to
say." Well, nothing could have been more wrong. In the seven years
from 1964 to 1971, the law moved at blinding speed to encompass all
of those doctrines and more, and now it has surely receded, but nothing
will ever be as it was before 1964.
I do not know whether Feist presages that kind of rapid movement. Certainly I think it does not. I doubt it. But that it is a different
kind of case in constitutional terms, I equally have no doubt. It cites
The Trademark Cases as though the distinctions between trademarks
and copyright, which appeared in The Trademark Cases, were distinctions which deserve to go on unchanged. I think, however, that we have
to doubt whether in fact that would be so. I suspect that the distinctions between trademarks, insofar as they involve the elements of appropriation that are of concern to Professor Raskind, and which in the
past have enjoyed a separate status constitutionally as against copyright, will become conflated with copyright in just those respects and
increasingly so. How rapidly and in what kinds of cases, of course, I
can no more predict than you. But that those cases are coming, and
that they will be driven by a jurisprudence grounded in the exchanges
in our time-exchanges themselves no longer grounded chiefly in the
press but rather in fiber optics and micro chips-I also entertain no
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I sense in the Feist case the immediate presence of a Constitution
which will begin to live in our lives and order the arrangement we may
make of interests in this field that we call intellectual property, far
more immediately, far more insistently, than has been the case before.
And, I must say because I think the time has come that if this is
so, I welcome the advent of these cases and look forward to meeting
with you happily at conferences like these in the future. Thank. you.
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